can be handled in a scholarly inquiry or a closed door study by a panel of experts. Most essentially, this is because the effect of the legal process on a contested factual inquiry is similar to the application of a magnifying glass of high focal power. Issues spring up where they seem not to have existed; simple questions are transformed into matters of high complexity; and that which begins as complex is apt to become wholly unmanageable. All of this takes place in a verbal battle, one level removed from the facts under examination. The flavor was captured thirty years ago by Walton Hamilton and Irene Till in their description of an antitrust proceeding:
Every move, every witness, every fact, every document becomes a counter in a legal game. "The record" has come to do vicarious duty for an analysis of the industry in operation; and every item, favorable to one side, can win admission only against the heavy cross-fire of the other. Every procedural device which may arrest or speed action, flank or snipe the verbal minions of the enemy, color the conduct on parade with innocence or guilt, is called into play. The campaign is lost in its events. ' The problem is inescapable because the primary standard of procedural justice in a contested legal proceeding is not the efficiency of the procedures but the protection of the rights of litigants. Short of drastically truncating those rights, the only solution is to carefully shape the issues submitted to litigation such that they emerge in clearly articulated, simplified form.
This principle can be seen clearly at work in antitrust law. The success of that law is virtually coextensive with the operation of its simplified, per se rules, such as the rules against price fixing, division of the market between competitors, and horizontal mergers. Where complex rules have been employed, such as the Rule of Reason and in the rules governing remedial aspects of monopolization cases in the last thirty years, the result has been dismal failure.
Reducing Decisional Complexity
Since it will be my conclusion that it is not feasible to eliminate entirely from a deconcentration proceeding the highly complex issue of an efficiencies defense, I am concerned that there are additional complexities that may engulf the proceedings. As matters now stand there are at least seven complex issues to be resolved in a reorganization proceeding, which is roughly five too many. The result is likely to be the draining of All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms vital energies from the crucial issue of efficiencies, resolution of which will control effective implementation of the act.
While outside the scope of my article, I tentatively will indicate how these other decisional complexities might be reduced. First, in place of the present three-part test, a single test for monopoly power should be substituted: whether four or less firms account for 50 percent or more of sales. This would delete the two more elusive alternative tests based on high profits and absence of substantial price competition. Second, the new single test would be conclusive rather than merely presumptive of monopoly power. This removes a potentially troublesome Sherman Act inquiry as to whether the four or less firms identified as holding 50 percent or more of the market do in fact possess "monopoly power." Third, administration of the patent defense should be shaped to prevent submersion of the proceedings in a bog of patent invalidity and patent misuse claims. One approach to this defense, which permits monopoly power to be retained if resting solely on valid patents not misused, might be to assume the validity of any patents not previously declared invalid and to require the patent misuse to be flagrant.
The Efficiencies Defense
The Lessons of the Past
The draftsmen of the industrial reorganization bill did not attempt to write on a clean slate. In providing for the defense of loss of substantial economies they engrafted the concept and the very language of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Moreover, the issue of loss of economies also has arisen from time to time under the antitrust laws.
What lessons does this past history have to teach us?
PROTECTION OF CREDITORS AND INVESTORS. Divestiture under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act required the reorganization of literally billions of dollars of assets in the form of notes, debentures (secured and unsecured), preferred stock, common stock (voting and nonvoting), and warrants, held at various levels of multitiered holding company structures. The complexity staggered the imagination. In the case of secured instruments the very properties upon which the securities rested often had to be divided. Yet the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was charged with administering the act, was able to preserve the relative value of the various securities to a remarkable degree.2 The SEC was given substantially the full discretionary powers of a court of equity, and at least under these circumstances the lesson from the past is one of striking success.
VIABILITY OF DIVESTED PARTS. That assets or companies divested shall be able to survive as going concerns is, of course, a minimal condition for divestiture feasibility. So far as I have been able to discover, this condition has been met in divestments under the Public Utility Holding Company Act. Indeed, the commission several times denied divestiture when it had serious doubts as to the ability of the isolated system to survive. Surprisingly, in divestitures under the antitrust laws the separated parts often have failed. This has occurred in instances where there has been a sale of assets or companies to outsiders. An example under Section 2 of the Sherman Act was the court- who wished to pursue divestiture at whatever cost and those who sought to modify the impact of the law by making divestiture a matter of administrative discretion.6 As passed, the act provided that a public utility holding company would be limited to a single integrated system except in those cases where an additional system could not be operated independently "without the loss of substantial economies."7
The issue frequently was litigated as holding companies made repeated attempts to justify retention of one or more additional systems. A study of this litigation provides less guidance than one might anticipate for an effective, even handed application of an economies defense. To some extent the statement seems justified that the SEC circumvented the defense.
To begin with, the SEC often was able to bypass the issue of economies by deciding the case on an alternative basis. This was because, unlike the provision in the proposed deconcentration statute, loss of substantial economies was not in itself sufficient to save a system from divestiture; two other conditions also had to be satisfied: geographic contiguity and preservation of the benefits of local management.8 If either of these conditions were not met, the economies issue could be, and frequently was, avoided as unnecessary to decision.
Nevertheless, my research assistant, who spent over 100 hours studying the Utility Act decisions, discovered no less than 22 cases in which the economies issue was resolved, although the depth and degree of the analysis varied greatly. Indeed, these decisions reveal that, from the beginning, the SEC adopted a very restrictive view of the economies defense. Defendants were required to prove the existence of substantial economies, not by the usual preponderance of the evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.9 Applying this stringent standard, the SEC developed a series of hurdles which, despite growing sophistication on the part of defendants, proved impossible to surmount except in one very narrow class of cases (discussed below).
In rejecting proferred showings of economies, the SEC offered five reasons, which the courts generally sustained. First, the general quality of the evidence was defective, as based on incomplete data, or not based on the estimates of unbiased observers, or not sufficiently quantified.10 Second, some particular error in the evidence was discovered, for which reason the entire offering must be rejected (rather than revised to correct the error). A striking example of this occurred in the New England Electric case, where an entire cost estimate by an independent consulting firm was rejected due to a single error."1 Third, the economies were found not to be of the kind protected by the statute, such as loss of ability by the principal system to borrow cheaply from the subsidiary.12
Fourth, the economies were not operational economies, such as financial know-how (which could be learned), or tax advantages (which were deemed fortuitous and a function of the changing state of the tax law). 13 Finally, in the case of combination gas and electric companies, any economies, including convenience to consumers in joint operation, were outweighed by the (unqualified) benefits of competition.14 The net result of all this, not surprisingly, was that in scarcely any instance was the economies defense sustained. Despite the persistently negative ultimate findings, the decisions reveal that there were some economies which the SEC was willing to take more seriously than others. This permits a brief summary to be made of the kinds of proof of economies that stood the best chance of success before the SEC. A strong economies case would (1) rest on the separate findings of two or more teams of independent experts, (2) rely on economies of joint usage of personnel and property, (3) United Shoe offered evidence which the court accepted as "fully qualified, disinterested and able" that United simply had no equal in the development of machines involving "complex motions in small space."
And the court itself characterized United's research organization as having demonstrated "efficiency, intelligence and vision." Nevertheless, the claim to superior efficiency was rejected because the rate of improvement of old machines and invention of new ones did not appear to the court, or to United's chief competitor, whose testimony the court cites, as creating a "formidable record" or justifying "special encomia."'21 Perhaps inevitably, the decision appears subjective. This may explain the court's unwillingness to countenance division of the research facility. It also reveals the difficulty of litigating an issue of dynamic efficiency. The lesson that can be drawn from this is limited. Divestitures under the Public Utility Holding Company Act followed the exposure of widespread management abuse and were themselves a visible demonstration that needed reforms were being accomplished, helping to restore investor confidence. Moreover, the securities market placed a discount on the indirect ownership of operating companies, which divorcement removed.25 Finally, to the extent any inefficiencies were introduced by the breakups, these were ameliorated by the fact that the operating companies were regulated monopolies, utilizing a cost plus method of pricing at As for the Sherman Act cases, the divestitures under Section 2 typically did no more than replace single firm monopoly with highly concentrated oligopoly; hence these cases really do not approach the issue under the Hart bill. Spin-off of a previously independent company, illegally acquired, similarly fails to answer the question which the division of going concerns would raise.
WERE EFFICIENCIES IN FACT
The short of the matter is that the past history of proceedings under the Public Utility Holding Company Act and under the antitrust laws supplies scant illumination for the path to a feasible economies defense.
Economic Tests for Efficiencies
Turning from the dusty records of past judicial proceedings, it remains to consider what light economic science can cast upon the problem of ascertaining efficiencies. Legal development often, and not always to its disadvantage, has followed advances in economics. Yet, as suggested earlier, the legal process places a severe constraint on the use of economic analysis: The analysis must be capable of reduction into a comparatively simple, two-valued rule. The legal rule must pronounce that "substantial efficiencies" are either present or that they are not.
Unfortunately, my brief review of the economics of efficiency determination has not led to the discovery of an economic test that is capable of reduction to the simple scope of a workable legal rule which will be dispositive of the efficiencies issue. Perhaps I should make a little more explicit my reading of the economic literature. First, I find a fairly general agreement that plant economies are exhausted at relatively small scale. The situation is less clear as to firm economies, both in terms of their existence and their social desirability.26 Second, while there are various tests for ascertaining economies, both plant and firm, none is really suitable for judicial use. The test that comes closest as suitable for a judicial proceeding is the survivor test, under which minimum efficient scale firm is determined by observing the minimum size firm within a defined market that has been able to survive and grow. However, the literature advises that in the view of some economists, at least, there are serious problems with this test, for example, it sometimes leads to seemingly bizarre results as when the smallest and largest firms "survive." 27 The other tests for efficiencies, engineering, statistical, and profit, are each more complex than the survivor test, entailing difficult and highly debatable engineering and accounting judgments. Application of any one of the tests could increase the complexity of a legal proceeding by gather, when not one but several tests for efficiency are employed together. As if all this were not enough, there are both static and dynamic efficiencies to be considered. There is X-efficiency, learning effects efficiency, and research and innovative efficiencies (although some of these concepts are perhaps already incorporated in the standard tests).28 I conclude that the economic tests are not suitable singly or in a group for blanket incorporation into the deconcentration statute, but properly hedged and restricted, as outlined below, may provide some guidance.
Alternative Legal Approaches to Efficiencies
Chastened by the limited guidance that is to be drawn from past legal history and economic science, it is my task now to suggest how the issue of economic efficiencies feasibly can be managed in a deconcentration proceeding. There seem to be four possible approaches: (1) Strike the defense from the proposed statute; (2) sustain the defense where there is proof of any significant efficiency loss; (3) sustain the defense only when the efficiency loss is not outweighed by the competitive gain; and (4) sustain the defense, as the proposed bill now would do, only where the efficiency loss is serious or substantial.
The second and third possibilities can be eliminated quickly. To permit the defense on proof of any significant efficiency loss would make the act a dead letter. As experience under the Public Utility Holding Company Act shows, it was a poor management that could not point to some kind of efficiency loss in the separation of even the most isolated utility system.
To require, as would the third possibility, a weighing of efficiency loss as against competitive gain is to compare the obscure with the inscrutible. This was amply demonstrated in the instance of the Public Utility Holding Company Act where such consideration was sometimes attempted. It simply was not done in any rational manner, and it could not be done. The same inability to measure the future competitive impact of new organizational entities caused courts over a decade ago wisely to remove from merger litigation any assessment of the future competitive effects of a merger-a key step in the success of that law.
We must take the first possibility much more seriously. If we, as 
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The only certain benefit is a reduction to some unspecified extent in centralized economic power. All else is shrouded in unascertained probabilities: the loss or increase in the value of output, the impact on business incentive, and the redistribution of political power. In short, the net gain or loss depends upon uncertain probability estimates multiplied by highly subjective payoff values.
Let us turn from this inconclusive vector of forces to consider the impact of deconcentration on those I would call the morally blameless bystanders. These are persons who have made commitments based on the existing scheme, but who are not responsible for it; they may be shareholders, creditors, employees, geographic communities, and perhaps in some sense society as a whole in its reliance on private firms for invention and innovation. Should not the rights of these bystanders impose a constraint on deconcentration policy? One response no doubt will be that there are others, such as consumers, who are equally morally blameless, who have been injured and will continue to be injured unless centers of monopoly power are broken up; these others may in some cases be poorer than the individuals I have referred to. While I concede the persuasiveness of the argument, I deny its implication.
There is a deep-seated policy in our law favoring the protection of vested rights. Such a policy could be said to perpetuate injustice since many vested rights have a tainted foundation. Yet the theory of such protection is that it gives a security to the structure of society's entitlements, which enhance the welfare of all, since without such security no one could be sure that the entitlements he enjoys today would be secure This is not to defeat the idea of deconcentration, but to place a con- No severe disruptions should be caused to geographic communities.
The relation of the efficiencies defense to these constraints is clear. A severe loss of efficiencies is apt to impose some or all of the losses enumerated above. And the losses would be no less because they stemmed from impairment of firm efficiencies rather than plant efficiencies, hence both types of efficiencies should be recognized. The constraints also have implications for the type of relief to be imposed. Radical surgery, such as the closing on short notice of plants or units, could severely disrupt smaller communities and employment. It also could cause large fluctuations in securities values, which would become permanent losses for those who must surrender their commitments during the short period.
The thrust of all of this is toward gradualism in adjudging relief and toward voluntarily conceived plans. These considerations frequently will militate in favor of relief centered on lowering of entry barriers, aimed at achieving deconcentration over a longer time frame. Yet immediate and direct divestiture is not by any means ruled out.
Formulating a Specific Approach
With these constraints in mind and in light of the legal history and economic views discussed, is it now possible to consider a more specific approach to the handling of the efficiencies defense? Essentially I shall suggest a three-stage procedure.
Step 1 would be to designate what I shall call a dissolution target. This would consist of the minimum deconcentration necessary to achieve a market structure that is workably competitive. Definitions as to what is workably competitive no doubt will vary, but I would define this as a market structure free of highly concentrated oligopoly and in which there are several innovative centers. A typical dissolution target might be a minimum of twelve firms in the market, with no firm larger than 10 percent. This is to be contrasted with the language in the present bill, which calls on the commission to determine "the maximum In the third stage, defendants would be given the opportunity by any means they think appropriate to prove loss of substantial economies.
Here the demanding qualitative standard on proof of efficiencies imposed by the SEC under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act is worthy of some emulation; thus, the insistence on thoroughly grounded projections by independent experts is a sound requirement. On the other hand, care must be taken not to go so far as did the SEC in undermin- I would fully expect that this standard might be met and the defense sustained in some cases, particularly given the slippage in the litigation machinery. But I would not fret over this; indeed, in some ways I would welcome it. For it would serve to reassure the public that real economies were not being sacrificed in the deconcentration program, and I would hope that this would help to steady investment values in those deconcentrations that were ordered.
Moreover, and this point bears emphasis, the sustaining of an economies defense would not terminate the deconcentration proceeding. On the contrary, it might help pave the way for the alternative remedy, the lowering of entry barriers, for the efficiencies defense will require the firm to demonstrate with some precision the particular efficiencies or methods that enable it to enjoy lower costs or higher profits. Such a demonstration may provide precisely the information the commission needs to determine the relief necessary to lower entry barriers. Entry barrier relief necessarily will be slower than divestiture, but that very gradualness is exactly what is desired under the criteria I have urged, when substantial economies are involved.
Certain procedural devices would be desirable to shorten and simplify All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms the complex proceeding that an efficiencies defense, whatever its form, entails. Such devices, many of which have been used in past protracted litigations, might include filing in advance of the hearing all direct testimony in narrative form and exhibits, exchanging objections to testimony and exhibits and rulings thereon in advance of the hearing, confining the actual hearing to cross examination, greater use of court-appointed witnesses, and possibly the use of expert masters to determine technical questions of engineering and cost accounting.
Conclusion
The industrial reorganization bill can be made legally feasible. Some of its decisional complexity can be removed without injury to its basic object, the limitation of economic power. The difficult issue of efficiencies remains, but a legally feasible way of handling this issue seems possible. According fair recognition to the defense and avoiding the stringency that was imposed on the similar defense in the administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act are apt to bar some divestitures, but in those cases relief could then proceed by the more gradual method of removing entry barriers. Even in those instances where no effective relief at all results, there is value in the proceedings, for they require concentrated economic power to account for its stewardship and to demonstrate that the continuance of such power serves the public interest. At least once in a generation that is a healthy posture for those who hold great power, economic or any other kind.
Of course, there are risks, and these have been expressed with determination by a distinguished spokesman: "The drafters of this bill are self-proclaimed disciples of the social theory that American corporations are too large, and consequently their operations should be divided into small pieces.... Suffice to say ... that ... the application of such a theory to American business in whole or in part will result in a financial and economic chaos compared to which the present economic condition will look like prosperity."' 1 Perhaps such fears are exaggerated, for that 
